Protect your data from the threat of the quantum computer with post-quantum cryptography
Context
The promises of quantum computing
Quantum computing exploits the principles of quantum mechanics – superposition, entanglement, etc. – to solve certain classes of problems at speeds unheard of in traditional computers. While this computing power provides extraordinary opportunities, it also represents a paradigm shift for cybersecurity.


Threats
Quantum-induced cyber risks
Quantum computing power is a threat to today’s foundations of cryptography, both for symmetric (AES, ChaCha, etc.) and asymmetric (RSA, ECC, Diffie-Hellman, etc.) cryptographic systems. Although Grover’s algorithm is only likely to reduce the resistance of symmetric encryption algorithms, Shor’s algorithm could potentially break any RSA, ECC or DH key in a matter of days or even hours.
Threat actors are already collecting encrypted traffic today, waiting to decrypt it tomorrow. Known as “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later”, this approach is regularly mentioned in the official documents of government bodies such as ANSSI in France and the US Federal Reserve. It means that sensitive data encrypted with conventional algorithms have already been compromised in the long term, when quantum computers are capable of breaking current encryption keys.
PQC
The need to adapt encryption algorithms
Since 2016, in response to this threat, the NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) has been leading an international process to standardise new algorithms that are resistant to quantum attacks. To this end, in 2024, the first post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards were published. New algorithms are expected, including some standardised by other bodies (e.g.: ISO for FrodoKEM).

Stages in the PQC migration scenario
The migration to post-quantum cryptography is a transition process that needs to be structured and gradual. In Europe, cybersecurity agencies (ENISA, ANSSI, BSI, etc.) insist that migration must not be abrupt: a hybrid approach is mandatory, as it ensures that in the event that a PQC algorithm were to be compromised, there would be no reduction in security. In this context, crypto-agility refers to a system’s ability to change protocols, keys or even algorithms without an architectural overhaul – a basic requirement for a controlled migration in the long term.
1
Before
Asset protection using traditional algorithms.
2
Now
Introduction of hybrid cryptography combining a classical algorithm and a post-quantum algorithm.
3
Tomorrow (almost)
Gradual elimination of traditional algorithms, retaining only post-quantum ones.
Quantum-Safe
Implement post-quantum protection today
Your protection against the quantum threat starts with cybersecurity equipment that is capable of implementing PQC algorithms in practical form in critical network components. That’s why at Stormshield – a French player in sovereign cybersecurity – we have integrated an initial post-quantum encryption building block into the IPsec component of our Stormshield Network Security (SNS) firewall products. The ML-KEM algorithm is now available, with easy configuration for simplified migration in line with ANSSI recommendations.
Is your infrastructure ready to face the quantum threat?
Contact us
When it comes to post-quantum technology, turn to Stormshield, a trusted European player. As a subsidiary of the Airbus group, we continue to track the increasing maturity of algorithms and protocols through our trends monitoring unit, which is working in parallel on interoperability tests with other network components.
FAQ
Your questions about post-quantum cryptography
What is PQC?
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) refers to the set of cryptographic algorithms designed to withstand attacks from a quantum computer. Unlike traditional algorithms, whose security is based on mathematical problems that can be solved by a quantum computer using Shor’s algorithm, PQC algorithms rely on other classes of problems: Euclidean lattices, error-correcting codes, hash functions, etc. The term “post-quantum” does not mean that these algorithms need to be run on a quantum computer: they work on current computer hardware.
What is ANSSI’s official position on PQC?
In 2022, France’s ANSSI cybersecurity agency published its position on the migration to post-quantum cryptography, which has since been updated. It recommends a gradual approach with an initial hybrid phase: any migration must combine a tried and tested conventional algorithm and a PQC algorithm, so as not to introduce any security regression. ANSSI also recommends crypto-agility: designing systems so that they can change algorithms without a major architectural overhaul.
ANSSI does not impose a rigid timetable, but its Director General, Vincent Strubel, mentioned two dates during a speech in France in 2025:
- from 2027, the agency will no longer accept products for qualification that do not incorporate cryptography that is resistant to quantum computers;
- by 2030, the agency is planning to introduce a requirement that such vulnerable solutions can no longer be purchased on their own.
Who could potentially be affected by “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” attacks?
Any organisation whose data has long-term value could potentially be the target of “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” (HNDL, also known as “Store Now, Decrypt Later”) attacks. The following parties are therefore particularly at risk:
- players in the defence and intelligence sectors,
- healthcare establishments whose medical records are retained for ten years,
- industrial groups whose manufacturing secrets represent a long-term competitive advantage,
- financial players whose transactions and contracts incur interest over several years,
- critical infrastructure operators, and others.
What is hybridisation in post-quantum cryptography?
Hybridisation involves the combination of a traditional algorithm with a post-quantum algorithm in the same key exchange or encryption mechanism. This approach is the pragmatic response to current uncertainty: PQC algorithms are recent, and their practical long-term security, although based on solid mathematical foundations, does not yet have the same track record as RSA, ECC or DH. Hybridisation allows action to be taken now without introducing risks: if PQC is ever compromised, the traditional solution still applies; if the traditional solution is broken by a quantum computer, PQC takes over.
Does post-quantum also apply to authentication or signatures?
Yes, the subject of post-quantum cryptography also applies to authentication and signatures, but this aspect is less urgent – and therefore less mature – than the issue of encryption, because authentication and signatures are not subject to the current “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” risk. Authentication and signatures will become urgent only upon the actual arrival of the quantum computer, which will then be capable of retrieving a private key and enabling fraudulent authentication or signature to be carried out. However, solutions providers (such as Stormshield) are already at work in this area.
What is crypto-agility?
Crypto-agility is the ability of a system or infrastructure to replace or update its cryptographic elements (including algorithms) without requiring a complete architectural overhaul. This is a design principle: these elements are not hard-coded into the equipment, but are configurable and interchangeable via policies or software updates. In post-quantum terms, crypto-agility is essential for two reasons: it enables new PQC standards to be adopted quickly as and when they are finalised; and it offers the necessary resilience if a PQC algorithm were to be weakened by some new and unexpected mathematical advance. A crypto-agile firewall can switch from ML-KEM to FrodoKEM, or adopt a future ISO or NIST standard, without the need for interruptions to service or hardware replacements.